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The aim of this paper was the application of the failure mode and effects analysis 
(FMEA) approach to assess the risks for patients undergoing radiotherapy treat-
ments performed by means of a helical tomotherapy unit. FMEA was applied to 
the preplanning imaging, volume determination, and treatment planning stages 
of the tomotherapy process and consisted of three steps: 1) identification of the 
involved subprocesses; 2) identification and ranking of the potential failure modes, 
together with their causes and effects, using the risk probability number (RPN) 
scoring system; and 3) identification of additional safety measures to be proposed 
for process quality and safety improvement. RPN upper threshold for little concern 
of risk was set at 125. A total of 74 failure modes were identified: 38 in the stage of 
preplanning imaging and volume determination, and 36 in the stage of planning. The 
threshold of 125 for RPN was exceeded in four cases: one case only in the phase 
of preplanning imaging and volume determination, and three cases in the stage of 
planning. The most critical failures appeared related to (i) the wrong or missing 
definition and contouring of the overlapping regions, (ii) the wrong assignment 
of the overlap priority to each anatomical structure, (iii) the wrong choice of the 
computed tomography calibration curve for dose calculation, and (iv) the wrong 
(or not performed) choice of the number of fractions in the planning station. On 
the basis of these findings, in addition to the safety strategies already adopted in 
the clinical practice, novel solutions have been proposed for mitigating the risk of 
these failures and to increase patient safety. 
PACS number: 87.55.Qr




The benefits of ionizing radiation in medicine are well accepted even though the risks, coupled 
with their use, cannot be entirely eliminated. While the diagnostic use of radiation requires 
suitable methodologies to minimize the dose without impairing the diagnostic quality,(1) the opti-
mization in radiotherapy must be achieved by maintaining sufficiently high doses to irradiated 
tumors and protecting, at the same time, the healthy tissues to the largest extent possible.(2) 
In modern radiotherapy (RT), much effort is being invested to improve the conformity of dose 
distribution, as well as to integrate imaging techniques for tumor tracking and correction of inter- 
and intrafraction variations.(3,4) Intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) is becoming the 
standard technique for achieving highly conformal irradiation volumes in many RT  treatments 
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through the intersection of numerous beamlets. Most commercial IMRT systems evolved from 
conventional linear accelerators (linacs) equipped with multileaf collimators (MLCs). A spe-
cifically designed IMRT machine, which also integrates a highly image-guided system, is the 
helical tomotherapy. Indeed, a tomotherapy accelerator basically combines the main features 
of a linear accelerator and a megavoltage computed tomography (MVCT) scanner.(5)
A common aspect of all the new technologies and methodologies introduced in the modern 
RT is the level of complexity, evidently much higher than the recent past (i.e., before IMRT 
became a major radiotherapy treatment modality). The increased complexity related to the 
technological and process changes in RT places new demands on quality assurance (QA) 
 programs, as well as innovative instruments and detectors for beam characterization and 
checks.(6,7-8) Moreover, new approaches to safety are required, since complexity may also 
increase the sensitivity to uncertainties and risk for accidental exposures. Examples of 
 radiotherapy-related errors are unfortunately not uncommon, even in the countries with the 
highest level of health-care resources.(9) 
In order to fully assess and manage the risks of accidental exposures deriving from the use 
of innovative radiotherapy methodologies, prospective approaches, widely applied in high-
risk industry, should be implemented to determine all the elements that could go wrong and 
identify, a priori, all the potential hazards that might occur during a radiotherapy treatment.
(10) Prospective methods for risk analysis and patient safety improvement have been recently 
applied in various modern radiotherapy methodologies.(11-17) However, as far as authors know, 
no studies specifically dedicated to tomotherapy are available in the literature.
The aim of this paper was the application of the failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) 
approach to assess the risks for patients during the pretreatment phases in tomotherapy. The 
applied procedure included the definition of the processes and fault trees, the identification and 
scoring of each potential failure mode, and finally the suggestion of additional safety measures 
for process improvement and risk mitigation.
 
II. MAtErIALS And MEtHodS
FMEA is a prospective risk analysis approach routinely employed in several manufacturing 
 sectors, as well as in aviation. Recently FMEA was identified as a powerful tool in modern 
radiation oncology by the Task Group 100 of the American Association of Physicists in Medicine 
(AAPM).(17) The use of the FMEA approach was also recommended by the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) as a resource for improving the safety of 
patients undergoing modern radiation therapy treatments.(10) 
In this study, FMEA was applied to identify all the subprocesses involved in the stages of 
(i) preplanning imaging and volume determination, and of (ii) treatment planning, characterizing 
a RT process performed by using a helical tomotherapy unit (HTU). Afterwards, the potential 
failure modes (i.e., what could go wrong), together with their causes and effects, were identi-
fied and ranked in order of importance. Three indexes were assigned for each failure mode: the 
occurrence rating (O), the severity rating (S), and the detectability rating (D). A ten-point scale 
was used to score each category, ten being the number indicating the most severe, most frequent, 
and least detectable failure mode, respectively. The ranking scales proposed by Ford et al.(15) 
were adopted as guidelines. Finally, the risk probability number (RPN) was calculated as the 
product of the three attributes: RPN = O × S × D. As already applied in previous FMEA studies 
in RT,(11-13,15-17)  the value RPN = 125 was considered as a threshold below which the risk can 
be considered acceptable. However, it must be pointed out that this value, derived from industry, 
still remains somehow arbitrary when applied to RT and deserves further investigation.
The analysis was carried out by a working group (WG) composed by five people working 
at the San Raffaele Scientific Institute (three medical physicists and two radiation oncologists), 
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and by two additional external physicists with experience and competences in radiation protec-
tion and in risk management strategies for radiotherapy.
The delineation of the process trees and the identification of the potential failure modes, 
and causes and effects, were initially carried out through small group meetings. Afterwards, 
various collegial discussions were organized to revise the results the groups, and to identify and 
examine the additional safety measures for the risk mitigation. The risk attributes associated 
to each failure mode were initially conceived by each member of the WG in “blind mode”, 
then collectively revised during a dedicated plenary session to reach general consensus. The O, 
S, and D indexes for each failure mode were assigned by taking into account the current QA 
program and protocols developed at San Raffaele Scientific Institute and the safety measures 
already implemented.(5) 
Indeed, San Raffaele Scientific Institute was assumed as a reference for the detailed definition 
of the process tree and the estimation of RPN numbers. The Institute is equipped with three 
HTUs: the first one (TT1, Hi·Art II) installed in August 2004, a second (TT2, Hi·Art II) installed 
in May 2007, and a third one (TT3, Tomotherapy HD) installed in March 2012 (TomoTherapy 
Inc., Madison, WI). Currently, only the two newer HTUs are operating; the first unit is at the 
moment off and will be replaced with a new one. The two operating HTUs (TT2 and TT3) 
are twinned each other; the same beam model is applied and each unit is characterized by a 
proper MLC with specific mechanical characteristics and specific output factors. Each HTU is 
connected with one specific operator station (OS) and with its specific tomotherapy planning 
station (ver. 4.2.1.2), a dedicated treatment planning system (TPS) equipped with an inverse 
planning algorithm able to optimize and calculate IMRT treatment plans. A planning transfer 
station (PTS) is also connected to each unit in order to allow the patient to transfer from differ-
ent treatment machines. Each HTU, operator station, planning station, and PTS are connected 
into its own database. 
In addition to the HTUs, the radiotherapy department is equipped with two conventional 
linacs (one Clinac 2100CD and one Clinac iX; Varian Medical Systems, Palo Alto, CA) able 
to deliver IMRT and volumetric-modulated arc treatments (RapidArc). A simulator Acuity 
(Varian) and a dedicated CT GE HiSpeed (GE Healthcare, Waukesha, WI) are also installed in 
the radiotherapy department. 
The staff of the Radiotherapy Department includes ten radiation oncologists and 18 radiog-
raphers. The Medical Physics Department includes nine medical physicists, one radiographer, 
and four technicians. Around 200 treatments were performed every year on each HTU.
 
III. rESuLtS & dIScuSSIon 
The process tree of the preplanning imaging and volume determination stage is shown in Fig. 1; 
the process tree of the planning stage is reported in Fig. 2. Globally, 58 subprocesses were 
identified, starting from the patient identification up to the QA approval of the treatment plan. 
All the subprocesses were judged to be potentially prone to one or more failure modes. 
A total of 74 failure modes were identified: 38 in the stage of preplanning, imaging, and 
volume determination, and 36 in the stage of planning. Fifty-three failures (i.e., 72% of the 
cases) were considered of little concern in view of the RPN value lower or equal to 80. These 
failures are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 in a condensed form. A recurring minor failure in 
Table 1 was the improper imaging. It may occur in many subprocesses and, in most of cases, 
can be easily detected during the target/OAR contouring phase or simply during the upload 
and the visualization of the CT images. Typical examples are short CT slices acquisition, CT 
acquisition without an adequate patient preparation for special protocols (e.g., full/empty rec-
tum, full/empty bladder), CT acquisition without an optimal immobilization system). In these 
cases the effect on patient safety is of little concern, consisting of additional CT exposure and 
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consequent delay in the successive procedures. These same effects may occur when imaging 
data are lost, incomplete or corrupted during data transfer and saving procedures. 
In other cases, improper imaging could be more difficult to detect during the planning stage, 
as attested by severe incidents reported in the recent past.(9) In particular, a possible failure is 
the reversal of images as a consequence of incorrect positioning of the patient and/or incorrect 
selection of the CT scan protocol (i.e., “head first” vs. “feet first”).(18) However, in tomotherapy, 
thanks to the check of the patient position performed just before the treatment by means of the 
MVCT scanner, the detectability of this failure can be considered sufficiently high to make  the 
Fig. 1. Subprocesses of the preplanning imaging and volume determination stage in tomotherapy.
269  Broggi et al.: FMEA in tomotherapy 269
Journal of Applied clinical Medical Physics, Vol. 14, no. 5, 2013
overall risk acceptable. Furthermore, the MVCT pre-treatment imaging permits identification 
of possible discrepancies between the position taken by the patient during the preplanning 
imaging and that required for the treatment (e.g., arms up/down).
Possible minor failures in the planning stage (Table 2) caused by lack of attention are the 
missing of prescription data such as dose to planned target volume (PTV) or to overlapping 
regions, number of fractions, and dose limits to organs at risk (OAR). Since these data are 
strictly required by the medical physicist to start the treatment planning, their absence will only 
reflect in a delay of the process flow.
Fig. 2. Subprocesses of the planning stage in tomotherapy.
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Inadequate skill or lack of attention is also cause of other minor failures in the planning stage, 
such as the suboptimal choice of one or more parameters of the TPS (e.g., calculation matrix, 
field dimension, pitch, modulation factor, constrains). The possible effect of these failures was 
the delivery of a suboptimal treatment.
Table 1. Application of failure mode and effects analysis for the preplanning imaging and volume determination stage 
in tomotherapy. Failure modes having an assigned RPN ≤ 80 are listed.
  Subprocess  Potential Failure Mode
 I  Patient identification  Imaging of the wrong patient at a different 
anatomical site
    Imaging of the wrong patient at the correct 
anatomical site  
 II  Reading information on the RT record: recommended  Improper imaging
  immobilization system 
 III  Reading information on the RT record: patient  Improper imaging 
  position (prone-supine)       
 IV  Reading information on the RT record: anatomical Improper imaging
  sites  Improper planning optimization 
 V  Reading information on the RT record: imaging choice Improper imaging
 VI  Definition of the positioning system (not customized  Improper immobilization 
  system) of the patient on the CT simulator couch 
 VII  Identification of the customized positioning system of  Improper immobilization 
  the patient on the CT simulator couch 
 VIII  Positioning/alignment of the patient  on the CT couch  Improper imaging 
  on the basis of the laser  
 IX  Definition of the temporary isocenter on the basis of  Improper imaging due to impossibility to define 
  the anatomical site to be treated and placement of  red laser position 
  3 reference markers  
 XI  Recall the patient identity record from the RIS system  Incorrect association CT imaging – patient
 XII  Selection of the CT scan protocol Improper imaging
 XIII  Acquisition scout and scanning and CT imaging  Improper imaging – wrong anatomical region 
  reconstruction 
 XIV  Check of patient preparation Improper imaging     
 XV  Patient tatoos in the position of the 3 markers at the  Wrong isocenter 
  temporary isocenter  
 XVI  Save imaging data of the patient Data loss
 XVII Sending CT data and imaging to PACS Incomplete or corrupt data 
    Inability to find the patient data, research on other 
nodes, and/or resending
 XVIII  Possible other imaging procedures (MRI, CT-PET  Incomplete or corrupt data – inability to recover
  with definition of BTV, CT with contrast medium) the images  
   Difficulty in the image fusion
 XIX  Placement of the RT record in the folder “Planning  RT record loss 
  to be done” of the referring physician 
 XX  Recall of the list of the CT images  CT images not found
 XXI  Recovery of the CT images from PACS to TPS Images associated to the wrong patient
   Impossibility to reconstruct previous treatments
 XXII  Possible recovery of other images (from PACS via  Incomplete or corrupt data 
  DICOM or tomotherapy station)  
 XXVI  Automatic contour of the OAR Wrong OAR definition
 XXVII  Manual contour of the OAR Wrong OAR definition
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Twenty-one failure modes (28% of cases) were characterized by a RPN score higher than 
80. Ten of them, shown in Table 3, were identified in the stage of preplanning imaging and 
volume determination. The remaining 11 failures, which may occur during the stage of plan-
ning, are shown in Table 4. The mean values of the risk indexes of Table 3 were O = 3.3 (range 
3–4), S = 6.7 (range 5–8), and D = 4.8 (rage 3–6). Similarly, the mean values of the indexes of 
Table 4 were: O = 2.7 (range 2–4), S = 7.0 (range 5–8), and D = 6.2 (range 4–9). These data 
suggest that such events, on average, are infrequent (once or a few times a year) and not too 
difficult to detect (especially for the stage of preplanning imaging and volume determination), 
but potentially severe in terms of patient safety. The threshold of 125 for RPN was exceeded 
Table  2. Application of failure mode and effects analysis for the planning stage in tomotherapy. Failure modes having 
an assigned RPN ≤ 80 are listed.
  Subprocess  Potential Failure Mode
 XXXI In case of retreatment, reconstruction of the previous Wrong reconstruction 
  treatment planning Reconstruction not possible
   Reconstruction suboptimal
 XXXII Prescription of PTV dose (from protocol or personalized) Missing prescription in the record 
 XXXIII Prescription of dose to overlapping regions (from protocol Missing prescription in the record 
  or personalized) 
 XXXIV Definition of the fractionation of PTVs: number of fractions Missing prescription in the record 
  and daily doses  
 XXXV Definition of specific dose limits for OAR not to be Missing prescription in the record 
  exceeded 
 XXXVI  Placement of the RT record in the folder “Planning to be Missing record 
  done” according to the various therapy units. Planning for the wrong unit
 XXXVII Definition of help structure regions to make easier the Incorrect help structure region definition 
  optimization 
 XXXIX Send the contoured CT images from the Somavision/Eclipse Wrong data sent 
  station to the TPS of the chosen tomotherapy unit                       
 XLI  Assignment of the contoured structures as target and OAR Wrong assignment 
 XLIII  Placement of the mobile red lasers at the tattoos, if the Wrong positioning 
   distance between red and green lasers is higher that a  
max value, then placement of red lasers in other site  
and notification the distance markers/red lasers to the  
RT technician. 
 XLIV  Choice of the filed dimension Suboptimal choice
 XLV  Choice of the pitch Suboptimal choice
 XLVII  Choice of the target structure for the dose prescription,  Wrong choice 
  and choice of the dose prescription modality 
 XLIX  Choice of the modulation factor  Suboptimal choice
 L  Definition of dose-volume constraints to be associated to Suboptimal choice 
  the targets and to the OAR for the optimization phase 
 LI  Choice of the weights and penalties to be associated to Suboptimal choice 
  the structures and to each dose-volume constraint 
 LII  Beamlet calculation Beamlet recalculation 
 LIII  Optimization Incomplete optimization
 LV  Video approval of planning (without this approval it is Approval missing 
  not possible to treat the patient) 
 LVI  Treatment plan printing Printed copy of the treatment plan missing
 LVII  Video signature of the planning Signature missing
 LVIII  QA approval QA approval missing
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in four cases: one case only in the phase of preplanning imaging and volume determination, 
and three cases in the stage of planning. Actually, treatment planning is known to be one of the 
most critical phases within the whole RT process.(9)
Table  3. Application of failure mode and effects analysis for the preplanning imaging and volume determination stage 
in tomotherapy. Failure modes having an assigned RPN > 80 are reported. 
   Potential Potential Causes Potential Effects
 Subprocess No  Failure Mode of Failure of Failure O S D RPN
 VIII 
 Positioning/alignment  Wrong Inadequate Systematic
 of the patient on the 1 
definition CT shift of the
 4 8 3 96
 CT couch on the basis  of the laser patient
 of the laser  isocenter alignment position 
 X
 Reference markers  Missing 
Lack of attention Previous treatment
 positioning to 2 marker 
or incomplete not taken into 4 6 3 96
 indicate previous  positions 
compilation of consideration/
 treatment fields    the RT record suboptimal planning 
 XXIII
 Registration of 
 possible other  3 Wrong Consistency Wrong PTV and 3 7 5 105
 images from different   registration not verified OAR definition 
 techniques and check 
 of consistency     
 XXIV
 Definition of the
 GTVs and/or CTVs   
 contour on the basis 4 Wrong CTV Lack of attention/ Wrong dose 3 7 5 105
 of the anatomical  definition inadequate skill distribution
 and/or functional   
 information (BTV)      
 XXV
 Definition of ITV  Incorrect ITV Lack of attention/
 in the case of 4D 5 construction inadequate skill Wrong PTV 3 6 5  90
 CT acquisition      
 XXVI
 Automatic  Missing OAR Lack of attention/ Unintended normal
 contour of the 6 definition inadequate skill tissue irradiation 3 8 5 120
 OAR
 XXVII 
 Manual contour  7 Missing OAR Lack of attention/ Unintended normal 3 8 5 120
 of the OAR  definition inadequate skill tissue irradiation 
 XXVIII 
 Definition of the 
 planning structure   Wrong Lack of attention/ Unintended normal
 at risk through  8 expansion inadequate skill tissue irradiation 3 5 6 96
 automatic expansion 
 of OAR   
 XXIX 
 Automatic expansion
 with definition of the 9 
Wrong Lack of attention/ Unintended normal 3 5 6 96
 CTVs and PTVs  expansion inadequate skill tissue irradiation 
 margins   
 XXX   Lack of attention/
 Definition and  Wrong/missed inadequate skill 
Unintended normal
 contouring of 10 
definition
 or not detailed tissue irradiation 4 7 5 140
 overlapping    information on or wrong dose 
 regions   previous treatment distribution 
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Table 4. Application of failure mode and effects analysis for the planning stage in tomotherapy. Failure modes having 
an assigned RPN > 80 are reported. 
   Potential Potential Causes Potential Effects
 Subprocess No  Failure Mode of Failure of Failure O S D RPN
 XXXII
 Prescription of   Wrong Lack of attention/ Wrong dose PTV dose (from 11 prescription inadequate skill delivery 3 8 4 96 protocol or  in the record
 personalized)
 XXXIII 
 Prescription of     Possible wrong
 dose to overlapping 12 
Wrong Lack of attention/ dose distribution/  
 regions (from   prescription inadequate skill wrong dose 3 8 4 96
 protocol or   in the record  delivery
 personalized)    
 XXXIV
 Definition of the  Wrong fractionation of 13 prescription Lack of attention/ Wrong dose 3 8 4 96 PTVs: number  in the record inadequate skill delivery  of fractions and
 daily doses 
 XXXV
 Definition of  Wrong Lack of attention/ Unintended normal
 specific dose limits 14 prescription inadequate skill tissue irradiated 3 8 4 96 for OAR, not  in the record
 to be exceeded
 XXXVIII   Incorrect
 Possible contouring 15 Incorrect dose positioning in Wrong dose 2 6 7 84
 of the couch  calculation the imaging delivery
 XL
 If not automatically
 done, replacement  Incorrect dose Incorrect introduction Wrong dose in the imaging of 16 calculation of the couch position delivery 2 6 8 96  the CT couch   in the CT images
 (diagnostic) with
 tomoterapy couch 
 XLII
 Assignment of the 17 Wrong Lack of attention/ Wrong dose 4 7 7 196  Overlap Priority  assignment inadequate skill distribution
 to each structure 
     Wrong dose
 XLVI 18 Wrong choice Lack of attention/ calculation/wrong 2 8 9 144
 Choice of the   (kV-MV) inadequate skill dose delivery
 calibration curve  19 Wrong choice  Lack of attention/ Wrong dose 2 5 9 90
 nCT-nHU  (kV-kV) inadequate skill calculation/wrong 
     dose delivery 
 XLVIII
 Choice of the  20 Suboptimal Lack of attention/ Suboptimal 3 5 6 90
 calculation matrix  choice inadequate skill treatment
 LIV
 Introduction  Wrong or not
 of the number  performed choice Lack of attention/ Wrong dose
 of fractions and 21 (erroneous use of inadequate skill delivery 3 8 6 144 
 automatic generation  the default value)  
 of number of sessions  
274  Broggi et al.: FMEA in tomotherapy 274
Journal of Applied clinical Medical Physics, Vol. 14, no. 5, 2013
The failure mode with the highest risk (i.e., RPN = 140) within the stage of preplanning 
imaging and volume determination was the wrong or missing definition and contouring of 
the overlapping regions. Overlapping regions are, in general, defined to limit the prescription 
dose to some structures, both in case of overlapping between target volume and dose limit to 
organs at risk, and in case of retreatment. Typical examples of overlapping regions are the 
boundaries between PTV and chiasma and/or optical structures, PTV and anterior rectal wall, 
and PTV and duodenum and/or stomach. In tomotherapy, the overlapping regions of adjacent 
anatomical structures need to be defined and contoured, and a priority level has to be assigned 
during planning in order to achieve the correct dose distribution to the PTV and, at the same 
time, to spare the OAR.
If one or more overlapping regions are not properly defined or contoured by the radiation 
oncologist, the potential effect for the patient could be an unintended normal tissue irradiation 
or, more likely, a wrong dose distribution. The main cause of this failure was identified as a 
lack of attention or inadequate skill of the radiation oncologist in charge of defining and con-
touring the volumes of interest. Moreover, this failure might occur as a consequence of a lack 
of exhaustive clinical documentation about possible previous RT treatments. Indeed, the doses 
received by the various anatomical structures during previous irradiations have to be taken into 
account for defining the overlapping regions. 
An additional safety measure was suggested by the working group for reducing the prob-
ability of occurrence of this failure, and therefore for mitigating the overall risk. It consisted 
of improving the RT record of the patient through the systematic introduction of a sheet to be 
flagged containing detailed information about the prescribed dose to target volumes, OARs, 
and overlapping regions contoured with relative dose constraints. 
The most critical failure in the stage of planning (RPN = 196) was the wrong assignment of 
the overlap priority to each anatomical structure by the medical physicist. The TPS prompts the 
user to divide structures or regions of interest (ROI) into two groups: tumors and organs at risk. 
A ROI from the tumor group can overlap with a ROI in the OAR group, but the ROIs within the 
same group are not allowed to own common voxels. When two contours from the same group 
overlap with each other, the overlap priority setting governs to which structure the voxel belongs. 
The structure with the higher overlap priority will own the voxels in the overlap region, and 
the structure with lower overlap priority will lose these voxels for dose volume computations, 
optimization, and dose-volume histograms (DVHs) in the overlapping mode visualization.(19) 
Therefore, overlap priorities must be carefully selected since, in case of failure, wrong dose 
optimization can be generated with possible serious consequences for the patient. As for many 
other failures, this error was recognized as the result of a lack of attention or inadequate skill 
of the medical physicist in charge of planning. The probability of this failure going undetected 
was estimated to be relatively high if the final plan evaluation is based on only the DVH in 
the overlapping mode (i.e., the usual way to visualize the DVH during plan optimization). For 
this reason, the additional safety measure recommended by the WG consisted of a systematic 
final plan evaluation considering both the DVH in the overlapping mode and in the standard 
mode (i.e., the mode that provides the statistics of the entire volumes), regardless the defined 
overlapping priorities. It is interesting to note that the possibility to visualize and to print out 
the DVHs in the two different modes is an option of one of the latest TPS release. 
A further critical failure identified in the planning stage (RPN = 144) was the wrong choice of 
the CT calibration curve. This failure might accordingly occur when more than one CT scanning 
system is available, each of them with the proper calibration curve. Since the dose calculation 
process by the TPS is based on the data of the CT calibration, the wrong choice of calibration 
curve could reflect in a wrong dose calculation and, possibly, in a wrong dose delivery. This 
failure could be particularly critical in tomotherapy since, in the case of using MVCT instead 
of kVCT images, or vice-versa, a significant variation in the calculated dose (i.e., of the order 
of 10%) is expected. Indeed, the relationship of MVCT number to electron density is different 
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from that observed in common kVCT scanners as a consequence of the difference in physical 
interaction probabilities of photons within the two energy ranges. 
This failure was considered extremely hard to detect (i.e., D = 9). Indeed, the information 
about the CT calibration curve chosen for dose calculation cannot be included in the printed 
copy of the treatment plan. Therefore, the correctness of this parameter cannot be checked dur-
ing the plan evaluation before the final approval. On the basis of this analysis, the WG decided, 
as additional strategy, to suggest the vendor implement a new function in the TPS software, 
consisting of the possibility for the user to include the information on the CT calibration curve 
in the printed copy of the treatment plan. 
The last major failure (with a RPN = 144) which might occur during the planning stage, 
was the wrong (or not performed) choice of the number of fractions composing the treatments. 
A default number of fractions equal to 30 is set in the TPS. This value must be changed by 
the planner according to the particular prescription. If the planner fails to perform this task, 
the consequences for the patient could be particularly severe, since a wrong daily dose could 
be delivered during the treatment. The additional safety measure recommended by the WG 
is to increase the probability of failure detection by the RT technician before the treatment 
start through the systematic check of the agreement between the number of fractions actually 
prescribed in the radiotherapy sheet and the number of procedures visualized on the screen of 
the tomotherapy control unit.
In addition to the failure modes with the highest overall risks, specific attention should be 
paid to the failures which could lead to severe injuries to the patients, independently of the RPN 
value. In this analysis, seven failure modes characterized by a severity index S = 8 and RPN < 125 
were identified (i.e., failures No. 1, 6 and 7 in Table 3 and Nos. 11-14 in Table 4). The wrong 
definition of the isocenter during the positioning of the patient on the CT couch, even though 
potentially dangerous, appeared easily detectable, since the laser alignment is daily checked 
through the use of the MVCT scanner. No further safety measures are, therefore, required.
The risk of missing OAR definitions can be simply mitigated through the implementation 
of the safety measures formerly proposed. In particular, the suggested improvement of the RT 
record could significantly reduce the number of occurrences of these failures. 
Finally, additional safety measures are required to deal with the remaining failures — the 
wrong prescription of dose and/or dose limits. Systematic double-check of these data by the 
radiation therapy staff, and/or the definition of reference protocols, could be an adequate solu-
tion increasing the detection rating of these failures.
The failure modes shown in Tables 1–4 were identified by analyzing the typical sequence 
of events and procedures that characterize the standard RT process. However, in clinical prac-
tice, some deviations from the standard process flow might occur as a consequence of specific 
medical or organizational needs. Unfortunately, such process changes cannot be considered 
free from additional potential failures. In particular, three events which could affect the patient 
safety were identified by the working group and are briefly described below.
1. When the prescribed dose to the PTV is high, it may occur that the HTU is not able to deliver 
the entire dose in a single fraction; the physicist has to duplicate the number of fractions and 
write in the radiotherapy sheet to deliver two fractions every daily treatment session. If the 
indication is not clearly reported, this can result in an uncorrected daily dose delivery to the 
patient.
2. Sometimes, it could happen that the radiation oncologist decides to deliver more fractions 
than planned (e.g., if the treatment needs to be interrupted in a case where the patient expe-
rienced severe side effects). The TPS does not allow the physicist to add treatment fractions 
without replanning and recalculating the plan, but only those QA fractions on the operator 
station. So the patient can be treated, but the final treatment report does not record the added 
fractions and only the radiotherapy sheet can attest the real delivered dose. 
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3. As previously reported, at San Raffaele Scientific Institute two HTUs are currently operat-
ing. The two machines are twinned in order to have the possibility to transfer the patient 
from one unit to the other one (in a case where one machine needs maintenance). In such a 
case, the patient should be immediately cancelled from the original unit, transferred to the 
second one, treated, deleted from the TPS of the second unit, and finally transferred again 
to the original unit. In fact, this procedure would permit the tracking of the treatments actu-
ally done by the patient on the two units. However, it must be considered that every transfer 
entails a new final dose calculation (taking into account the specific output factors and MLC 
mechanical characteristics of each unit); moreover, each of these operations takes a lot of 
time to be completed. So, usually the patient record remains simultaneously on the two TPS 
for few days and, in this way, the only possibility to check the number of fractions actually 
delivered is through the radiotherapy sheet of the patient. 
In all these circumstances, more flexibility of the system should let the operator to modify 
the schedule of the treatment so as to avoid communication errors that can induce an incorrect 
dose to patients. One solution could be the implementation of a record and verify system; a 
session, daily, and total dose accumulation point could also be a safety issue.
In addition to the safety measures specifically related to tomotherapy proposed by the WG, 
the results of this analysis confirmed the soundness of the general lessons and recommenda-
tions provided by ICRP for preventing accidental exposures from new external beam radiation 
therapy technologies.(10) Indeed, during the identification of the causes of failures and the 
estimation of their occurrence probability, it came out that the competence and skill of the 
various professional figures involved in the RT process, as well as the work environment, play 
an important role both for the quality of the treatment and for patient safety. Regular updating 
of the knowledge and maintenance of the skills of the personnel can, therefore, represent an 
efficient instrument for patient safety improvement. In particular, the development of specific 
professional training schemes on the functionalities and limits of the various systems and 
software used in the RT process, as well as on the procedures and protocols, can be considered 
a general action for reducing the frequency of failures and, consequently, the overall risk of 
accidents in tomotherapy. Furthermore, excessive workload should be avoided, and a suitable 
work environment that encourages working with awareness, facilitates concentration, and 
avoids distraction should be provided.
Finally, as in other modern RT techniques, in tomotherapy in vivo dosimetry could provide 
a reliable way of detecting serious anomalies potentially leading to substantial overdoses or 
underdoses to the patient. 
 
IV. concLuSIonS
The application of FMEA to the preplanning imaging, volume determination, and treatment 
planning stages in tomotherapy led to the identification and deep investigation of various 
failure modes. The assignment of a score assessing the potential risk for each event permitted 
a ranking of these failure modes in order of importance and the ability to define priorities for 
risk mitigation, with the aim of optimizing quality management workflow. In addition to the 
safety strategies already adopted in the clinical practice, novel solutions have been proposed 
to increase patient safety. 
Although this study was carried out considering the specific processes implemented at San 
Raffaele Scientific Institute, the proposed methodology, as well as likely most of the findings, 
can be generalized and made useful to other RT centers equipped with HTU.
On the basis of the results obtained in this study and of the experience accrued by the WG,(20) 
further stages of the RT process, such as treatment delivery and treatment monitoring and veri-
fication, will be analyzed by means of the FMEA approach in the  near future.
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